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GUIDE TO THE ELECTORS OF GREAT BRITAIN

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# GUIDE

TO THE

ELECTORS OF GREAT BRITAIN,

UPON THE

Accession of a New King,

AND THE

*IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF A NEW  
PARLIAMENT.*



FIFTH EDITION,

WITH CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS.

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## PREFACE.



THE few following sheets, under the title of “ A Guide to the *Electors* of Great Britain, &c.” were put very hastily in the press at a period when the late General Election had very nearly or already begun ; they are now re-published in the same form, and with the hope that the *Elected* may extract from them some information and lights for the approaching and most interesting meeting of a New Parliament.

The only additions made in the body of the tract itself are, that part of the argument for a Place Bill which relates to Members of the House of Commons holding pensions under the Crown, and sinecure offices, (and which was most unaccountably overlooked in the previous editions,) and the observations respecting the office of the Third Secretary of State.

It has been thought fit, too, for the use of Members of Parliament, to put in the Appendix, No. I. an extract from the Colonial Act of Barbadoes, which created the Fund called the Four-and-a-Half per Cent. Leeward Island Duties, together with the different proceedings in Parliament relating to this Fund, which took place upon the accession of Queen Anne,

and which are all carefully extracted from the Journals of the House of Commons. With these different documents before their eyes, Parliament and the Public will be able to decide whether this fund of the four-and-a-half per cent. duties is not legally and strictly applicable to public purposes in the Island of Barbadoes, and to such purposes only ; or whether it is, in point of law, the private property of Mr. Canning's sisters, Lord Stanhope's sisters, Mr. Charles Long, Lady Grenville, Mrs. Huskinson, Sir Home and Lady Popham, and the various other persons who now claim to be entitled to it in possession or reversion. This will be one of the many points of vital importance to be discussed in the approaching question of the NEW CIVIL LIST. Mr. Canning's Creed is, that the Constitution "*works well*:" this is the

doctrine which he preaches and prints in the various places where he attends, as it were professionally, for the purpose of enlightening the country; and it may be quite true, as far as relates to himself, his family, and friends; but for *Us—the People*—this is the very point on which we are at issue with that gentleman. WE are of opinion that the Constitution “*works*” grievously *ill*; that it has been most grossly and scandalously abused for many years past; and OUR greatest anxiety is, that with the assistance of our New Representatives we may be able to restore it to what it has been in happier times.

For the purpose of shewing that there is nothing wild or extravagant in recommending such a House of Commons as is pointed out in the following sheets, there



is subjoined in Appendix, No. II. another "*Guide*" for the Election of Members of Parliament, of considerable antiquity, of the first authority, and one that has, in addition to these circumstances, the peculiar distinction of being a *Court Guide*. This proclamation for calling a New Parliament was the production of Lord Bacon, (approved, as he tells us, by Lord Coke,) and published by King James I. It is just two hundred years since this proclamation saw the light, at a time when our Constitution, as since happily established, had scarcely begun to shew itself, and yet it prescribes the most perfect model for all ages, of a wise, virtuous, and independent House of Commons. As such it is most earnestly recommended to the perusal of all persons in these kingdoms, both Electors and Elected. It will hence be

seen, that the persons of those days, who may be considered as the pensioners and holders of sinecures in our own times, were by no means overlooked by Lord Bacon, Lord Coke, and King James; and that when the latter admonishes the Electors of England “*not to disvalue and disparage the House of Commons with bankrupts and necessitous persons,*” “*nor with mean dependants upon great men,*” His Majesty does nothing more nor less than what is urged in the following pages of a much more humble *Guide*.

# A GUIDE,

&c.

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## ELECTORS OF GREAT BRITAIN,

IF you value your properties, and your liberties, now is the time to make your stand ; we have lately witnessed the accession of a new king, and we are shortly to have a new parliament ; upon the election of the latter, the fate of yourselves, and your posterity depends.—Attend to me, whilst I state to you without any colouring or exaggeration, your real situation. I will use no fact without producing or referring to the proper voucher for its truth, and when I have done so, judge for yourselves.

Our representatives, the House of Commons, are in the language of the Constitution, “ *The Guardians of the Public Purse,*” and they formerly were so. It is nearly two hundred years since, that a great and glorious fight was made by the House of Commons against the Crown, to prevent the latter from taxing the people at its

own will and pleasure, and without the consent of their representatives in parliament. This contest ended as it should do : the guardians of the public purse, were triumphant in the cause of their constituents.

By an extraordinary and unnatural revolution in our affairs, we the people, the Electors of Great Britain, are now engaged in a contest with our representatives, with the guardians of the public purse, and the crown united. Is there any man who doubts this fact ? If there be, let me refer him to the history of the attempt in parliament in 1816, to impose upon us a property tax of 5 per cent. in a time of peace—At that period (as at present) there was a positive solemn contract by act of parliament between the crown and the subject, that a direct tax upon property, should never be resorted to but in time of war—the minister of the crown, nevertheless, during a time of peace and in violation of this law, proposes the measure in the House of Commons ; the voice of all England from one extremity of it to another, is raised against this breach of faith and attack upon our properties ; the minister, however, proceeds in perfect confidence from his experience, that *the guardians of the public purse* will be too many for their constituents, and it was by accident only that his calculation of success was defeated. We owe our escape on that

occasion, to the promptitude, firmness, and talents of a single individual, I mean Mr. Brougham.

By the delays which the forms of parliament allowed that gentleman to interpose in the progress of the bill, a period was allowed for the indignation of the country to shew itself in a manner that was finally successful.

Ministerial members were compelled by this means to attend at meetings of their constituents, and in many instances, obliged against their wishes, and perhaps their promises, to vote against this measure. It was, I say then, this accident of delay that saved us; and after all, what was our triumph? The people of Great Britain by a majority of *thirty-seven* of their own representatives, succeeded in preventing 5 per cent. upon the whole of their property, from being taken from them at the suit of the minister of the crown, in violation of a positive legal contract, and in defiance of their unanimous detestation of the measure.—With this memorable history before our eyes, is it not fitting that we should look for means of self-preservation, against all future and similar attempts upon our properties?

Let us examine, then, the causes which have produced this change in the characters of our representatives, which have converted them from being the real inflexible guardians of the public purse, into the willing servants of the crown.

The first and great cause of this revolution, I pronounce to be our enormous National Debt, and the money paid in the collection of the taxes. In the beginning of the reign of his late Majesty, the annual interest of the National Debt and other charges payable for the same, was 3,302,673*l.* (see the Journals of the House of Commons;) at the present day, the *collecting only* of the taxes costs Great Britain, 3,392,326*l.* and for Great Britain and Ireland, 4,283,600*l.* (see Annual Finance Account) that is to say, at the close of the reign of his late Majesty and at present, there was and is a much greater sum paid among tax-gatherers of all descriptions, than was paid for the interest of the National Debt at its beginning. Who then is it that disposes of this enormous sum of four millions, paid in the collection of the taxes? Who possesses the patronage, the appointment, to the collectorships? Nominally it is the Crown; but in truth it is the House of Commons. Does any man doubt this fact? If a gentleman represents a town of any commercial importance and supports the government by his vote in parliament, does he not attend regularly, at the Treasury, and demand as a matter of right, the filling of all vacant appointments in the customs, excise, stamp office, &c. of the town he represents with his own relations, friends, or political



supporters? In the like manner, if he represents a county and supports the minister, is not the valuable appointment of Receiver of the land-tax, with other such things, considered immediately as his own private property, and don't we invariably see those appointments come into possession of his brother, or his son, or some family or political connection? It is only a few years ago, that Mr. Wilberforce was reprov'd in the House of Commons by Mr. Canning, was taxed by him as it were, for ingratitude in opposing the government on that occasion, upon the sole ground that Mr. Wilberforce was as regular a suitor at the Treasury for the disposal of offices in the revenue in favour of his friends, as any other ministerial member, and on that account that they, the ministers, had an equal right to his vote and support.

Here was no dispute, no difference of opinion, respecting the fact; on the contrary, you have the admission from the gravest and highest authorities, that the distribution of this four millions of money, paid for the collection of the taxes, is considered the absolute right of all members of parliament who support the government, and to be by them disposed of in favour of their families, friends, and supporters.

This, then, I consider to be the first and great operating cause by which our representatives are

removed from the reach of their constituents ; from the very sources of our own miseries they have discovered the means of procuring wealth and emolument ; whilst we, the people, are ground to the earth by the taxes, the families and connections of our representatives are absolutely supported by the very collection of these taxes.

I come now to other sources of influence, that have found their way into the House of Commons, and which all join in separating our representatives in interest from the people. Let us take the East India Company for instance. —This Body was originally a purely commercial corporation, trading upon a joint-stock capital ; in the progress of time, they have acquired a territory in India so enormous as to contain a population of fifty millions of souls, and to yield a revenue of sixteen millions of money a year. It is unnecessary now to dilate upon the enormous patronage that has arisen out of this Indian empire ; the civil, the military, the judicial, the naval, the commercial appointments that are thus put at the disposal of the Directors of the East India Company. Well, in the year 1784, this East India Company was put, for the first time, under the controul (as it is called) of the Crown, by an act of parliament then passed ; and from that day to this, as might be expected, Indian patronage has continued to flow into the



House of Commons, and to be used by the Ministers of the Crown, in that assembly, precisely in the same manner and for the same objects as the collection of the taxes. We all remember, or at least every one ought to remember, what happened in the House of Commons in 1809. It then appeared in evidence before parliament, that Lord Castlereagh, being at the time Minister of the Crown, presiding over the government of India, had actually disposed of one of the Company's appointments, a writership, by way of barter or exchange, for a seat in the House of Commons, which seat was to be filled by Lord Castlereagh's friend, Lord Dunlo, now Earl of Clancarty. And when this case was brought before the House of Commons by Lord Archibald Hamilton, as a grave matter of charge against Lord Castlereagh, and after Lord Castlereagh had fully admitted all and each of the facts of the case to be strictly true, the House of Commons did nevertheless, upon serious debate and division, fully absolve Lord Castlereagh from every kind of blame in this transaction. So here again, we have a solemnly recorded decision of the House of Commons, that Indian patronage, like the collection of the English revenue, is just and lawful prize to members of the House of Commons, and that it is to be used by them for whatever pur-

poses they chuse, whether of private emolument or public corruption, without the slightest attention to the complaints or remonstrances of their constituents. Can any man think of this last-mentioned case, and at the same time doubt, that the House of Commons is changed in its nature from what it formerly was, or can he doubt that this enormous Indian patronage, so divided as it now is with the Crown, is one of the many and great causes that has produced this fatal change in the practice of our constitution ?

I proceed to other sources of parliamentary corruption. Let any man refer to the Third Report of the Finance Committee of the House of Commons in 1807-8, and to the two Appendixes to that Report, and he will there find by the Returns which members of the House of Commons have themselves made to that Committee of the profits of the places they hold respectively under the Crown ; that there are *seventy-six* members of the House of Commons who are in possession of such offices, and that the united profit of them is £156,606 per annum. Under all these circumstances, who can wonder at the separation in interest which we so evidently perceive between our representatives and ourselves ? Fancy to yourselves the ordinary occupation of a day in London by most of our representatives. During the morning you may find

them at the Treasury in pursuit of appointments in the revenue in favor of their brothers or cousins, or friends, and parliamentary supporters ; or at the Board of Controul, or India House, soliciting writerships and cadetships for their sons and nephews. In times of war, the Admiralty and Horse Guards are equally beset by these parliamentary visitors, for commands and commissions. Follow the same persons in the evening to the House of Commons, and there see them joined by that solid body of reserve, the *seventy-six* placemen, who have £156,000 divided amongst them ; and now let me ask you, if in a company thus composed, the Minister of the Crown should be pleased to propose a tax upon malt, or any other article in which we, (the people) are deeply interested, what chance, I say, do you suppose we have of escaping this burthen, however unanimous our voices may be against it? We know, to our own sorrow, and to the shame of our representatives, that we should have none. Who can wonder that it should be so after what I have stated to you ?

But the sources of parliamentary corruption are by no means exhausted. Let me refer you to a fund called the Droits of Admiralty. This fund arises from the sale of such of our enemy's ships as have been taken by our King's ships before a formal declaration of war, and the regu-

lar issuing of letters of marque and reprisal. Although this fund has been so enormous during his late Majesty's reign as to amount to many millions of money, and although by parliamentary agreement with his late Majesty at the commencement of his reign, he was to have £800,000 per annum for his life, and as his civil list, instead of all hereditary revenue, (which, by the act of parliament was directed for the future to be applied for the benefit of the public)—notwithstanding all this, I say, of late years it has been the practice of the Ministers of the Crown in the House of Commons to assert, that this immense produce of the Droits of Admiralty does not belong to the public, but that the King (or rather the Ministers) may give it away amongst members of the House of Commons, or any persons else, exactly as they please. A most curious illustration of both their principle and practice on this subject took place in the year 1808-9. In the course of that year, Dr. Lushington, the member for Yarmouth, an intrepid and invaluable member of parliament, brought before the House of Commons the consideration of the following case:—By the record of proceedings in a cause before the Lords Commissioners of Appeal in Prize Causes, and which Dr. Lushington caused to be laid on the table of the House, it appeared that the ship, *Etrusco*, then commanded

by the present Sir H. Popham, had been condemned as good and lawful prize, her cargo, value £25,000, being contraband or smuggled goods. By another instrument, viz. a warrant of the Treasury, signed by Mr. Charles Long and others, as Lords of the Treasury, it appeared that this loss of £25,000, which Sir Home Popham had sustained in smuggling, was made up to him by a grant of the same sum out of the Droits of Admiralty. This warrant was likewise produced to the House, on the motion of Dr. Lushington, and with this record and warrant on the table, and Mr. C. Long, and Sir Home Popham, being both members of the House of Commons, and both present, Dr. Lushington moved, “ that Sir Home Popham, “ in being detected in knowingly carrying on an “ illegal traffic, had acted in contempt of the laws “ of his country, contrary to the duty of a British “ subject, and to the disgrace of the character of “ a British officer ; and further, that the grant “ of £25,000, by Mr. Long, to him, out of the “ Droits of Admiralty, had been a gross misap- “ plication of public money.”

Upon debate on this question in the House of Commons, not a single fact being denied or disputed, Sir Home Popham and Mr. Long were fully acquitted of all blame by a majority of 126 to 57. When one member of parliament can thus give to another such a sum of money as



twenty-five thousand pounds out of the Droits of Admiralty, it accounts for that loyal clamour which we hear so incessantly in parliament, of this fund being the private property of the king. It exposes, without the necessity of any comment, the fixed determination of the House of Commons, to draw all sources of emolument within their own hands ; and above all, it demonstrates to us, the Electors of Great Britain, the absolute necessity, that there is in our approaching agreement with the new sovereign, for ever to separate this enormous fund, the Droits of Admiralty from the grasp of the Members of the House of Commons.

Another fund devoted to the corruption of the House of Commons, is what is called the four and a half per cent. Leeward Island Duties. This is a fund in amount, from thirty to forty thousand pounds a year, and consists of a tax of four and a half percent. imposed upon certain produce in the Island of Barbadoes and Leeward Isles. It was created originally\* by a colonial law of Barbadoes one hundred and sixty years ago, and by the terms of the act was to be applied to purely colonial purposes. This fund seems to have been first diverted from its original and legal application, in the latter end of Charles II.'s time. It was seized by the courtiers in those times, and continued apparently

\* See Appendix, No. I.

to be abused till the reign of Queen Anne. Upon her accession,\* there is a statement in the Journals of the House of Commons of the misapplication of this fund, and a formal renunciation of it by the Queen and parliament in favour of the Island of Barbadoes, and the original purposes of the act creating it. At the present day however, the House of Commons have got almost exclusive possession of this fund. The two principal performers in the smuggling transaction, so lately referred to, are here to be found also: Sir Home Popham has a pension of five hundred per annum, with reversion to Lady Popham; and his benefactor, Mr. Long, has a pension of one thousand five hundred pounds per annum charged upon this fund also. In short, it is nearly exhausted amongst members of parliament, their wives, or sisters.

There is one name on this fund that ought never be forgotten by the people of England. We all remember the fatal expedition to Walcheren, when an army of forty thousand men, the finest that ever left our shores, was sent only to perish in that pestilential climate. When this distressing subject became matter of discussion and complaint in the House of Commons; when it was made apparent to every man in England,

\* See Appendix, No. I.

that it was to the wilful ignorance of our ministers respecting the nature of the climate of Walcheren, that this great national calamity was to be attributed, it was nevertheless resolved in the House of Commons, by a majority of two hundred and seventy-five, to two hundred and twenty-five, to negative the censure which was moved by Lord Porchester (now Lord Carnarvon) against the ministers on that occasion. But a severer trial still was to be made of the House of Commons. A vote of *approbation* of the ministers, was absolutely moved for this frightful Walcheren expedition ; and was adopted by a majority of two hundred and fifty-five, to two hundred and thirty-two !—The member of the House of Commons, who moved the vote of approbation, was General Crawford, and at that time there stood against his name on the list of the four and a half per cent. Leeward Island duties, a pension of one thousand two hundred pounds per annum for his life. General Crawford, no doubt, is a distinguished officer, and had been wounded in the service ; but there are many, very many officers in our army, as distinguished as General Crawford, and who have been much more severely wounded, who have served many more campaigns than General Crawford, and rendered much more important services to their country ; yet you may ransack all the pension lists in vain to find the



sum of fifty pounds a-year, much less one thousand two hundred annexed to the names of such general officers.

To speak then, historically of General Crawford in this transaction—He had recently become connected by marriage with the family of the Duke of Newcastle; he represented and commanded that powerful parliamentary interest in the House of Commons; the minister of the Crown, selected him as a fit person to enjoy a pension of one thousand two hundred pounds a year for life; and the General considered the minister of the Crown as entitled to the gratitude of his country, for his expedition to Walcheren. This is all according to form and usage in the House of Commons practice—but we, the Electors of Great Britain, are deeply interested in preventing, if we can, this fund of the four and a half per cent. from ever again being doomed to the same prostitution.

It is impossible to quit this fund without adverting to one other pension which is charged upon it. I mean, that for ever memorable provision for Lady Grenville of one thousand five hundred pounds per annum for her life, in the event of her surviving Lord Grenville.

Since Lady Grenville obtained this grant, she has succeeded to the great possessions of her brother, Lord Camelford—Lord Grenville holding

a sinecure himself of four thousand pounds a year out of the taxes, as Auditor of the Exchequer. His eldest brother, the late Marquis of Buckingham, beside his great estates, held the enormous sinecure of tellership of the Exchequer, worth latterly thirty thousand pounds per annum ; his other brother, Mr. Thomas Grenville, holds another sinecure worth nearly three thousand pounds per annum ; Lord Braybroke and Lord Carysfort, who married sisters of Lord Grenville, hold each of them, through the interest of that family, sinecures that are worth some thousands a year ; and yet after all this, the devoted planters of Barbadoes are mortgaged to Lady Grenville for one thousand five hundred pounds for life, if she survives Lord Grenville !—It can be matter of surprise to no man, that when bills are brought into parliament to stop the mouths of the people, Lord Grenville and his family should be always the first to support them ; it is quite consistent with their interest so to do ; *for us* of the people it is natural that, taxed to the utmost farthing as we are, we should wish to see the money that is taken from us, fairly and honestly applied to public purposes ; for *Lord Grenville and his family*, it is quite as natural to think, that the less that is said upon all such disagreeable subjects the better.

You would suppose by this time that we had exhausted the hiding-places of members of parlia-

ment and their connexions ; but there are nooks and corners to be yet looked into. You will find by reference to the Third Report of the Committee of the House of Commons before mentioned, that in the different offices of state and departments of revenue, the very fees which are exacted from the pocket of the subject are converted into a fund for House of Commons' purposes. Under the head of *Superannuations* in the Foreign Office, you will find no less a sum than £1000 a year for life, settled upon the wife of Robert Ward, Esq. of that department. Who then is this superannuated Robert Ward ? The date of his pension is February, 1806. It is said he was then about three or four and thirty years of age, and had been Under Secretary of State about ten or eleven months. It is known, that for thirteen years since he has filled, and fills now an efficient department in the Ordnance, with a salary from 2 to £3000 per annum. How then became Mr. Ward superannuated so much before his time as to entitle him to this pension of £1000 per annum for the life of his lady ? Why, I will tell you :—It is because Mr. Ward was, and is one of Lord Lonsdale's numerous members of parliament, and because Mrs. Ward is the sister of Lady Mulgrave, Lord Mulgrave having been the Minister who gave Mr. Ward this pension.—

Again, in the Stamp Office, you will find a provision made out of the fees, in favour of a Mr. Estcourt, amounting to £1200 per annum for his life, and it is added, “as the late Solicitor to the Stamp Office;” and who is this retired attorney, for whom so magnificent an allowance is provided, the greatest sum the Crown can grant to a subject by Mr. Burke’s Civil List Act? Why, Mr. Estcourt is the proprietor of the Borough of Malmsbury, and returns two members to the House of Commons, and this is his claim to £1200 per annum, for life, out of our pockets, and no doubt, an unanswerable claim too, in the opinion of all Ministers. I conclude this catalogue of ways and means for the support of members of parliament, and their families, by observing, that in addition to all other funds before referred to, it appears by the said Third Report, that no less a sum than £58,000 was raised in the year 1809, by the sale of old stores in the King’s Dock Yards, and that this sum, as well as all others, which are derived annually from the same source, is disposed of at the absolute discretion of the Minister of the Crown.

Having thus established, as I think I have done, the present degradation of the House of Commons, and explained their separation in interest from their constituents, and having stated, as distinctly as I could, the different causes which

have produced it, I return to the remark I set out with and I repeat—" Now is the time, Electors of England, to take your stand in favor of your properties and liberties or to lose them for ever."

Our representatives are shortly to return amongst us: they are much more manageable, much more upon their good behaviour, when we have them single handed and upon a canvass for our votes, than when they are out of sight and acting together as a corporation. This is the time to state plainly our demands upon them, and to vote for no one who shall not implicitly promise to comply with them.

First then. As the nation will now be called upon to make a provision for our new sovereign, and as this is a question of vital importance to our interest, let us make our first and great stand here. In this country we are all of us for a monarchy, and we are all of us for providing handsomely for the comforts and even splendor of the monarch; but I presume we are all of us equally against creating funds for the corruption of our representatives under pretence of providing for the Crown. Let then the sum about to be set apart for the maintenance of the Crown, be strictly defined, and let it be the only one that the Crown and its ministers can ever dispose of without the consent of parliament.



By the act made on his late Majesty's accession to the throne, the sum of eight hundred thousand pounds per annum, was settled upon him for his life ; and by Mr. Burke's Civil List Act, passed in 1782, his Majesty was incapacitated from giving away more than ninety thousand pounds a year in the shape of pensions out of this fund, nor could he grant any one pension greater in amount than one thousand two hundred pounds a year. Here then is a perfectly intelligible principle for us to act upon—The difference in the value or cost of all articles of life since his late Majesty's accession to the throne has made it necessary at different times to make a great augmentation to the amount of his civil list ; and this augmentation must now be continued. But the very cause for this augmentation, viz. the increased cost of every article of life, or in other words, the great increase of the taxes, is a conclusive argument against extending the power to the Crown to give away public money in pensions. Let us then exact a solemn promise from all candidates for our support at the ensuing election, that in the approaching settlement of a civil list for his Majesty, they will vote for such a clause or clauses in the Act, as shall for ever preclude his Majesty and his ministers, from granting by any warrant, to any subject of these

realms, any sum or sums of money, or any pension or pensions whatsoever, out of any public fund or funds whatsoever, other than his Majesty's Civil List Revenue, and in that case subjected to the limitations contained in the act, of the 22d of his late Majesty ; that they will to their utmost use their endeavours, that the funds called Droits of Admiralty, shall on all future occasions, be considered as public money, and strictly accounted for as such, and that no portion of it shall be disposed of except by vote of parliament ; that they will to their utmost use their endeavours that the fund called the four and a half per cent. Leeward Island duties, shall be forthwith restored to the Island of Barbadoes, and the Leeward Islands, in precisely the same form and manner as they were restored in the reign of Queen Anne as before mentioned ; and above all, that they will, to the utmost of their power by great legal penalties, or otherwise, make it impossible that either of those funds, the Droits of Admiralty, and four and a half per cent. Leeward Islands, or any part thereof, shall ever again be disposed of in favour of members of parliament ; and furthermore, that they will in such act of settlement on his Majesty, or in some other act, to the best of their endeavours, cause it to be enacted, that henceforth no minister of state, nor any person

presiding over any public office of state or department of revenue whatsoever, shall be competent to make provision for any person or persons whatsoever in the shape of either grant or pension out of old stores, fees, incidents, or any other sources whatsoever belonging to such offices of state or departments of revenue, but that all such old stores, incidents, and fees, (if continued) shall be considered as public money, and strictly accounted for as such at the Treasury ; and that all claimants for remuneration on the grounds of long and faithful services, or under the heads of superannuation, shall have their names and the nature of their claims submitted to the House of Commons, by the respective heads of their departments, and that all remunerations made to them in the shape of grant, or pension, shall be duly made by and provided for by parliament, and by no other authority whatsoever.

Thus much we are bound in duty to ourselves to exact from all candidates for our support, with respect to his Majesty's Civil List Revenue, after all the abuses we have witnessed in the different funds which have been claimed by the ministers as belonging to the Crown, for the purposes only of being used by themselves.

I come now to the collection of the Revenue ; and here again, all candidates for our support



are equally in duty bound to assist us. There are branches of this collection in which an immediate reform is not only practicable but obvious, and by which, not only great parliamentary patronage would be cut off, but a very great saving in point of money effected. The collection of the land tax, and the distribution of stamps, are at present offices of little or no trouble, and often executed entirely by deputy : at the same time these are the most valuable to the possessor, and expensive to the state, being paid by no other rule than that most foolish and extravagant of all rules, a poundage upon the gross sum collected. It is on all these accounts, that these offices are considered the capital prizes in the collection of the revenue, and are always to be found in the hands of the nearest connections of members of parliament. Now we all know that in every town in England, country bankers are to be found, who will take upon themselves the collection of these two branches of revenue—land-tax and stamps—without any pecuniary consideration whatever, other than the accommodation of a month or other time to remit the money into the Treasury, and that for faithfully doing so they will produce exactly as good securities as is now furnished to the government by the present collectors. But here is an æconomical reform effected to the extent of 300,000*l.* per

annum or thereabouts, and perhaps the very worst source of parliamentary corruption destroyed. Let us exact then from all candidates for our support, their positive engagement to promote to the utmost of their power this reform in the collection of the revenue.

As to the other great branches of revenue, the customs and excise, all we can do, is to strengthen the hands of the boards of commissioners who preside over them and protect them, if possible, from parliamentary intrusion—It was suggested in one of the Finance Reports of the House of Commons of 1799, that promotion by *succession, by regular gradation* in their departments might be adopted with advantage to the service, and certainly that system seems to answer most perfectly with the East India Company's servants. At present we know, that in every commercial town of any importance in England, the Custom House is absolutely overrun with persons wholly destitute of all experience or capacity for their employment, and who are placed there for no other reason than their being the friends, relations, or supporters of the member for such town, and who gives his vote to the Minister in parliament. We have a right then to expect an engagement from all candidates for our support, that some reform shall be introduced into the collection of these great branches of revenue, and that they

shall not be perverted for the future as they are at present, without the least reference to the demands of the service, merely to the maintenance of parliamentary connexions.

And now I come to our seventy-six members of the House of Commons, who divide the sum of £156,000 per annum.—Here we have happily, precedents taken from the best of times before our eyes, precedents, such as must satisfy the most timid, the most apprehensive of innovation, that there is nothing to alarm them in the reform to be proposed.—In the act of parliament which passed in the reign of King William, and which settled the crown of this realm on our present Royal Family after the death of Queen Anne without issue, it was enacted, that after the Hanoverian family should come to the throne, no person who held any office under the Crown, or who enjoyed any pension under the Crown, should be capable of sitting as a member in the House of Commons. Some three or four years afterwards, this subject was re-considered, and in another act of Queen Anne which created the regency in the event of that Queen's death, and the absence of the Hanoverian successor, the former disqualifying enactment as to places was repealed, and in its room was substituted this provision, viz. that from the passing of such act of Regency, all

persons holding *particular* places under the Crown *therein specified*, should be incapable of becoming members of the House of Commons ; that all pensioners during pleasure should be also excluded ; that all members holding any other places whatsoever not therein specified, should vacate their seats as members, upon their acceptance of such places, but that they should be eligible again at the pleasure of their constituents ; and furthermore it was enacted, that if any *new offices* should be created after the passing of that Act, all persons holding such offices should be incapable of sitting as members of the House of Commons.

Thus passed this Bill of Reform, and it is the law at the present day. It had for its author, the Prime Minister, Lord Godolphin—the Chancellor, Lord Cowper—and it had the support of Lord Somers—three as honest, able, and disinterested public men as this or any other country ever saw. Our present chancellor, Lord Eldon, is very fond of saying he is always anxious to act as he thinks Lord Somers would have done in similar situations ; and nothing can do more honour to himself, or more justice to the memory of Lord Somers than this sentiment. The question then which I put to Lord Eldon, and to every man in England is this,—If Lord Godolphin, Lord Cowper, and Lord Somers,

with all their experience, and with their known attachment to the Hanover succession—at that time, when the title of the Hanover family to the throne was more than disputed by a most powerful party in the state—when the East India Company and Bank of England were in their infancy, and the National Debt, in comparison, a trifle—if those great men then thought that the power of the Crown in the House of Commons was too great, and that it ought to be regulated and reduced, as it was by their bill of reform, to what extent may we not imagine their regulation and reduction to have gone, had they lived in times, when by the *collection* of the taxes alone the amount of four millions of money annually, was at the disposal of the members of the House of Commons; when all such other powers of English and Indian influence, as are before enumerated, have centered in the hands of that body, and are by them claimed and used as their own undoubted property? It is with this bill of Lord Godolphin's then, this Act of Reform, that we must now go to work. We are no wild theorists in attempting to apply the principle of these great authorities, and of their act of parliament, to our own times and our present condition. Let us, then, exact from all candidates for our support at the ensuing election, a solemn pledge, that they will,



to the utmost of their power, support a real and efficient bill of reform, as effecting the numbers of placemen who now sit in the House of Commons, and the provisions of which bill shall be very much to abridge that number. If we are asked to point out to them what placemen we would disqualify, we may reply, that the first object of such a place-bill should be the exclusion of all persons holding pensions under the Crown from being Members of the House of Commons. The authors of the two bills above referred to,—the Act of Settlement, and the Regency Act,—were all agreed upon this point, viz. That persons holding pensions during the pleasure of the Crown, were not fit to be trusted with the functions of Representatives of the People. A subsequent statute of George I. carried this branch of Reform still further ; and it was enacted, that no person holding a pension under the Crown for a *term of years*, should be capable of sitting as a Member of the House of Commons. The obvious and indispensable improvement upon this last bill is, to extend its provisions to persons who hold pensions from the Crown during *their lives*.—It is perfectly idle to attribute any superior degree of independence to the person holding a pension for his life, over him who holds one for a long term of years ; the disqualifying principle as to pensioners being repre-

sentatives of the people, applies equally to both cases ; they have each of them *received relief* from the Crown, and this is the true and unanswerable ground for their exclusion from the House of Commons. How is it possible for us, consistently with common sense, to act upon the principle adopted at our elections ; viz. to reject the votes of electors who are proved to be paupers, and to have received relief from the parish, without applying the same reasoning to the Member of Parliament who has received relief from the Crown. The case of the pensioner *in* parliament, is fifty times stronger than that of the pauper *out* of it. The relief which the pauper seeks is his own by right, and by the law of the land ; the pensioner's relief must be humbly sued for and obtained as a mere matter of grace and favor from the Crown. The pauper only asks to have a voice in the general delegation of power from the People to their Representatives ; the pensioner presumes to exercise that power himself, and to be himself the guardian of that public purse, out of which, behind our backs, and without our leaves, he has already procured his own subsistence or that of his family. It is impossible this defect in our Constitution can be longer continued, if our Representatives do their duty, and the present epoch of a new Reign and a new Parliament

is the precise period for settling the question for ever.

Another description of persons that ought most obviously to be excluded from sitting as Members of the House of Commons, is that of the holders of all sinecure offices. Every thing that has been said on the subject of excluding pensioners for life, applies equally to the holders of sinecures ; the latter are, in truth, pensions for life, and pensions of the very worst kind. In *theory* they are the rewards for eminent services of distinguished public men ; in *practice* they are the most prostituted sources of House of Commons corruption :—they pervade every department and every corner of the empire ; they are to be found in the administration of justice, in the collection of the revenue, in every part of the United Kingdoms, and in every colony belonging to them : they are not only an intolerable grievance as sources of corruption, but they are the perpetual obstacles to all economical Reform, the sinecure patentee being always on his defence against any alteration or improvement being introduced into the department on which he is quartered, least his *vested interest*, as it is called, might be eventually injured by it. The House of Commons is so sensible of the just indignation with which sinecures are viewed by every description of persons in the kingdom, that they make a



kind of periodical display of an intention to abolish them by Reports from Committees of their own body on this subject ; but never was an artifice more shamelessly avowed than this invariably is by the subsequent conduct of the House of Commons : for if a Member should take up one of these Reports, and only move that one of the sinecures so reported against should be abolished, the very members who composed such Report would be quite certain either to absent themselves from such discussion, or, if present, to negative by their vote in the House, the Reform which they themselves had proposed and recommended in the Committee. This case, extraordinary as it may appear, is by no means fabulous ; it has occurred several times of late years, and is quite capable of proof. It is true that upon one occasion, if not twice, the authority of Mr. Banks in the House of Commons has induced the Ministers of the Crown to withhold their opposition to a bill introduced by that gentleman, and which had for its object a very general abolition of these sinecure offices ; but it was perfectly understood at the time, that this highly beneficial measure was to be defeated by the Ministers of the Crown in the House of Lords, and accordingly, it was no sooner presented to that body than it was indignantly rejected. It is, however, of great importance that we have this recorded recognition

from the House of Commons themselves, that this great national grievance ought to be abolished ; and it is to be hoped that our New Representatives, with this important admission before their eyes, and supported as they will be by the unanimous feelings of the country on this subject, will lose no time in carrying this salutary branch of Reform into execution.

It can scarcely be necessary to defend the nation against any charge of being niggardly in its disposition towards such public men as have rendered it real and essential services ;—witness its numerous and munificent grants to the Duke of Wellington, to the family of Lord Nelson, with all the other provisions that have been made for our different naval and military men. When the *civil* servants of the state shall be recommended by the Crown to Parliament as objects of national remuneration, and shall submit to the same discussion of their claims with our officers by sea and land, who have received Parliamentary pensions, there will then be found no objection to their being so rewarded if such claims are substantiated : nor will their pensions so acquired be considered as disqualifications to their serving their country in the character of its Representatives. But the present disgraceful system of giving away pensions and sinecure places, out of sight of the public to the inferior civil officers of

the Government, and to Members of Parliament, or their connections, without the least pretension to merit of any other kind than a vote in the House of Commons, or an interest in a Borough, is an evil so intolerable, and so deeply affecting the Constitution, that we have a right to call for its immediate extinction.

With respect to other public offices that ought to be the subject of a Place Bill, the first and most obvious is that of the Third Secretary of State. This is a *new* office, and therefore by Lord Godolphin's Bill, no person belonging to it ought to be a Member of the House of Commons ; but this is not all, this office having been created during the American War, was formally abolished at the conclusion of that war by Mr. Burke's Civil List Act in 1782, so that any person holding an office in that department, and being at the same time a Member of the House of Commons, fills such situation in direct violation both of Lord Godolphin's Place Bill, and the more modern Reform Bill of Mr. Burke. It may be said, too, that for the public boards of the Treasury, Admiralty, and Ordnance, we see no inconvenience which the public interest would sustain, in having one member only of these boards a member of the House of Commons, admitting distinctly, as we do, the great utility of having one efficient responsible

member of each great department, always a member of the House. There is another department *called* a *board*, without the least foundation for such name, and which calls more loudly for reform, as to its members sitting in the House of Commons, than any other establishment ; I mean the *Board* of Controul. The history of this department affords so striking an instance of the change that has taken place in our Constitution, and in the character of the House of Commons, within these latter years, that I invite you to bestow upon it your most serious attention. It was in 1784, that the Crown acquired, by act of parliament, the power of controuling or superintending the East India Company's government of India, and a select number of the great Officers of State were named by that act, who were to possess this power under the Crown. I beg you to observe, that Mr. Pitt, in introducing this bill, informed the House, that it gave him great pleasure to have to state, that this new government for India was neither to cost the Company, nor the country, a single farthing ; that it was to be purely gratuitous ; no new salaries ; no new placemen in the House of Commons ; and so it lasted till 1794, when the gratuitous government of India for ever disappeared. On this last occasion (1794) four new officers were created, to constitute a board ; a President, two Commis-



sioners, and a Secretary, to be named by the Crown, and paid by the Company, the President to have £2000 per annum; the other three, £1500 each per annum. The same act which created this new establishment, repealed Lord Godolphin's act as far as related to the new places. By Lord Godolphin's Bill, no new placeman was ever to become a member of the House of Commons: by this bill of Lord Melville's, no less than four new placemen were qualified to become members all at once. So much for the change in the Constitution; and now for the change in the character of the House of Commons, as exhibited by their conduct towards this new establishment. Although this government for India was announced originally under the agreeable form of being purely gratuitous, yet in 1793 or 4, as we have seen, the late Lord Melville begun his system of providing for four members of parliament out of it (himself included;) in 1812, the present Lord Melville being President of the same establishment, and his father having obtained from the East India Company, a pension of £2000 per annum for his lady, the present Lord, I say, brought a bill into parliament, for raising his own salary from £2000 per annum, to £5000 and the same was enacted accordingly; and upon the conclusion of this connection between

Lord Melville's family, and the Company in 1813, the East India Company made the present Lord Melville a gift in hard money of no less a sum than £20,000. Now I should like to know what would have been said in Lord Godolphin's time—I wonder what Lord Somers would have said to a minister of the Crown taking a present of £20,000 from the East India Company! We know that the Earl of Danby was impeached, in those days, by the House of Commons for taking £5000 from the East India Company. Why did not the Bank of England give £20,000 to Mr. Pitt, in return for all the services he rendered that corporation? The one case is just as defensible as the other, and yet when this grant of £20,000 was brought before the House of Commons by Mr. Creevey in 1814, and by Lord Milton in 1815, it was considered as one of those questions called, in their own modern phraseology, *personal questions*—that is to say, an attack upon the profits or plunder belonging to parliament-men—and as such, immediately resented and rejected. If the Company thus openly and shamefully gives away £20,000 of its funds to a minister of the Crown, need one ask what it does with its patronage? Who then will say, with these facts in his recollection, that the Constitution is not changed—that the character of the House of Commons is not altered? But let us go on.



After all, there is no *board* of Controul for the government of India ; nor was there ever a single one since the passing of the act which made it ! The whole of the business is transacted solely by the President, whose duty, or whose office it is to read, and to alter, if he chuses, all the Company's political despatches to India ; and this he does, without any the least connection with the Board whatsoever ; so that the other members of the Board, as they are called, are not only introduced into the House of Commons, to the great injury of the Constitution, and in direct violation of Lord Godolphin's Bill, but they are brought in under false pretences, as holding offices, whereas they hold now nothing but the name and their salaries. And for this reason it is we have a right to exact from the candidates, for our support, a pledge to use their utmost efforts, that no other than the President of the India government shall in future be allowed to be a member of the House of Commons. It is scarcely necessary again to observe here, that although these officers are *paid* by the India Company, they are *named* by the Crown. *It is*, however, necessary to state, that in addition to the two junior Commissioners having nothing in fact to do with the affairs of India, neither the President, nor they, from modern experience, have any occasion to be in the House of Commons, as since the passing of the last act of agreement with the Company in 1813, the

name of India has never been introduced into the House of Commons but once, and on that occasion only for a vote of thanks to Lord Hastings.

There are other officers too in the House of Commons, who as well from the present enormous influence of the Crown in that assembly, as from their own peculiar situations, ought henceforth to be excluded. All the writers upon our Constitution dwell with peculiar emphasis upon the advantage we possess in having the legislative and judicial functions perfectly distinct—that we have one class of men to make laws, and another to put them in execution. Now this reasoning is all very just, and is strictly applicable to our twelve English Judges ; but it is by no means the case as to the Chief Justice of Chester, and the Judges for North and South Wales, for all these Judges are eligible to seats in the House of Commons, and are always to be found there. What then does this distinction mean upon a subject of such grave importance ? Are the population of Cheshire and Wales of so degraded a condition, that to give them the benefits of our own Constitution is quite out of the question ? This, I presume, is not to be maintained. Well then, is there something so infallible in the character of a Chief Justice of Chester, or a Welch Judge, that the moment he becomes so, all the prudential maxims of our Constitution no longer

apply to him? This view, I apprehend, will be as difficult to maintain as the other, for if there is an appointment under the Crown, which is jobbed by Ministers for political purposes in the House of Commons, more than another, it is this office of Chief Justice of Chester, and that of the Welch Judges, insomuch, that I believe we may reckon up about one dozen of persons now living, who have in their time filled the former place. Here again then, we have a right to demand a pledge for excluding these Judges from henceforth as Members of the House of Commons.

There is another description too of lawyers which ought to be excluded from the House of Commons, viz. the Masters in Chancery. By a very foolish bill (to call it by no worse name) which passed in the year 1806, this branch of the Court of Chancery is provided, not only with an increase of pay, but with enormous pensions upon the retiring of each Master from his office; so that as their situation is one of comparative obscurity, and requires not a farthing of expence to support it, their places are become, in truth, more valuable than those of our English Judges. Now, as these appointments are in the gift of the Lord Chancellor, one of the great officers of the Crown, a large increase in his patronage has thus taken place by the new bill, and precisely suited

to parliamentary purposes. No one who looks at the appointments of Masters in Chancery, as made of late, can do otherwise than observe the truth of what I am stating, or can doubt that eventually these Masterships will all come into the House of Commons ; so that here we have a right again to call for the future exclusion of Masters in Chancery from the House of Commons ; and we have additional grounds for this demand, from the fact, that by the law and the Constitution, Masters in Chancery are the proper servants of the House of Lords ; they are employed by that body every day as the bearers of their messages to the House of Commons and to that occupation they ought, as far as regards their parliamentary functions, to be confined.

I cannot conclude this enumeration of offices that ought to be abolished or secured from Parliament, without shewing you a still further reason for our mainly insisting upon this point. It is not only that in addition to all other sources of influence there are seventy-six members with £156,000 divided among them, who are quite certain to assist the Crown in all contests with us, their constituents ; but these seventy-six members are always *on the spot* ; their office as part of the House of Commons is always within reach ; there is a secretary of the Treasury in the House of Commons, who has a salary of

£4000 per annum for little else than keeping the placemen and other ministerial adherents in order ; and if by accident a tax bill was to fail from the absence of any of these servants of the Crown, he would be severely reprimanded, and perhaps cashiered. So judge for yourselves what the state of the House of Commons must be as each session of parliament draws towards its close. At such a period, the patience of gentlemen from the country may very reasonably be supposed to be exhausted, and themselves to be on their return home : There are perhaps fifty, sixty, or seventy subjects to be discussed the same day, or rather night : The Minister of the Crown has the power in the midst of all this confusion of chusing the time he may deem most favorable for bringing on any grant of public money, and for this reason the worst of his *money jobs* are generally withheld for the latter end of the session and a late hour of the night. At such times the guardians of the public purse have become reduced, to the faithful band of seventy-six placemen with a few India and Bank Directors ; and with such a body as this to constitute the only representatives of the people, can any one be surprized at their being too many for their constituents ? Or is there any one who does not demand that the principle of Lord



Godolphin's Place Bill shall be again applied to them ?

Electors of Great Britain ! I have stated to you faithfully the present condition of your representatives—the entire ascendancy that the Crown has acquired over them—and the means by which the purposes of the Crown are accomplished. I have stated to you likewise what appears to me to be the only course by which our representatives are to be rescued from their present dependance on the Crown, restored to the confidence of their country, and united in interest again with us, the People.

At the approaching general election you will have the opportunity of expressing your wishes, of issuing your *commands*, of exacting engagements in return for your votes ; and if you value your properties and your liberties—if you wish to preserve them by means which our Constitution still happily supplies us with—this, I repeat, is the time to make your stand ; and that you may effectually do so, to your own eternal honor, and for the interest and happiness of yourselves, your country and posterity, is the most earnest wish of your

BROTHER ELECTOR.



# APPENDIX.

No. 1.

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Four and a half per Cent. Barbadoes and Leeward Island Duties.

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AN Act for settling an Impost on the Commodities of the growth of this Island ; passed the 12th of September, 1663. No. 36.

EXTRACT.—“ Whereas our late Sovereign Lord Charles the First of blessed memory, &c. &c. &c.

“ And for as much as nothing conducteth more to the peace and prosperity of any place, and the protection of every single person therein, than that the Public Revenue thereof may be in some measure proportioned *to the PUBLIC charges and expences* ; and also well weighing the great charges there must be of necessity in maintaining the honour and dignity of his Majesty’s authority here—the *public meeting of the sessions, the often attendance of the council, the reparation of the forts, the building a sessions-house and a prison, and all other PUBLIC charges incumbent on the Government* ; do in consideration thereof, give and grant unto his Majesty, his heirs and successors

for ever, and do most humbly desire your Excellency to accept these our grants; and we humbly pray your Excellency that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by his Excellency Lord Willoughby, of Parham, Captain General and Chief Governor of this Island of Barbadoes, and all other the Carribee Islands, and by and with the consent of the Council and the Gentlemen of the Assembly, representatives of this Island, and by authority of the same, that an impost or custom be, from and after publication hereof, raised upon the native commodities of this Island, after the proportions, and in manner and form as is hereafter set down and appointed; that is to say, upon all dead commodities of the growth or produce of this Island, that shall be shipped off the same, shall be paid to our Sovereign Lord the King, his heirs and successors for ever, four and a half in specie for every five score."

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Journals of the House of Commons. Vol. 13,  
Fol. 800. 1701. 1 Ann.

The order of the day for the House to resolve itself into a Committee of the whole House to consider of the supply to be granted to her Majesty, for the better support of her Majesty's household, and of the honor and dignity of her Crown being read:

A petition of the agents, planters and merchants concerned in, and trading to the Island of Barbadoes was presented to the House, setting forth that there is a duty of four and a half per centum on the commodities of the said Island exported thence, which was granted by an act of the said Island in September 1663, *for the reparation and building of fortifications, and defraying all other PUBLIC charges incident*

*to the Government there, which has been collected by officers appointed by Commissioners of the Customs in England, and applied to other uses whereby the fortifications are run very much out of repair, and other public necessary works are unbuilt and their magazines unprovided ; so that in case of a war the said Island and all other the Sugar Plantations to the windward of Jamaica, would be in danger of being lost if an enemy should attack it, which would be a vast loss to England ; and praying, that the said duty of four and a half per centum may be applied to the uses for which it was given, in order to the defence and security of the said Island.*

*Ordered, That the said Petition do lie upon the Table, to be considered by the House.*

Fol. 818.—Colonel Granville reported from the Committee, to whom the said Barbadoes petition was referred, That they had directed him to move the House, that an humble address may be made to her Majesty, that the duty or impost of four and a half per centum, arising in Barbadoes and the Leeward Islands, subject to an annuity payable to the Earl of Kinnoul, his heirs and assigns, *be applied for the repairing and erecting such fortifications and other PUBLIC uses for the safety of the said Islands* as her Majesty shall direct, and that an annual account, how the said duties shall have been expended, may be laid before the House of Commons.

*Ordered accordingly.*

Fol. 828.—Mr. Secretary Vernon reported to the House, that their Address having been presented to her

Majesty relating to Barbadoes and the Leeward Islands as to the former part thereof, that her Majesty would please that the duty or impost of four and a half per centum *may be applied for the repairing and erecting fortifications and other PUBLIC uses for the safety of the said Islands*, and that an annual account how the said duties shall have been expended, may be laid before this House ; her Majesty was pleased to say, that she would give directions accordingly.

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## APPENDIX.

### No. 2.

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EXTRACT of a Letter from Lord Bacon to Lord Buckingham, inclosing a Proclamation for calling a parliament.

“ For that part touching the elections I have communicated with my colleagues, Sir Edward Coke, the two Chief Justices, and Serjeant Crew, who approve it well ; and we are all of opinion, that it is not good to have it more peremptory, more particular, or more sharp.

“ FRANCIS VERULAM, Canc.

“ October, 1620.”

“ Upon these considerations, and for that also in respect of so long an intermission of a parliament, the times may have introduced some things fit to be

“ reformed, either by new laws, or by the moderate  
 “ desires of our loving subjects, dutifully intimated to  
 “ Us, (wherein we shall ever be no less ready to give  
 “ them all gracious satisfaction than their own hearts  
 “ can desire) We have resolved, by the advice of our  
 “ Privy Council, to hold a Parliament at our city of  
 “ Westminster.

“ And because, as well this great cause,\* (there to  
 “ be handled amongst the rest and to be weighed by  
 “ the beam of the kingdom) as also the true and an-  
 “ cient institution of parliament do require the Lower  
 “ House, (at this time if ever) to be composed of the  
 “ gravest, ablest, and worthiest members that may be  
 “ found : We do hereby, out of the care of the com-  
 “ mon good, wherein themselves are participant  
 “ (without all prejudice to the freedom of election)  
 “ admonish all our loving subjects (that have votes in  
 “ the elections of knights and burgesses) of the points  
 “ following :—

“ First, That they cast their eyes upon the worthiest  
 “ men of all sorts, knights and gentlemen, that are  
 “ lights and guides in their counties, and experienced  
 “ parliament men ; wise and discreet statesmen, that  
 “ have practised in public affairs, whether at home or  
 “ abroad ; grave and eminent lawyers, substantial  
 “ citizens and burgesses, and generally such as are  
 “ interested and have portion in the state.

“ Secondly, That they make choice of such as are  
 “ well affected in religion, without declining either on

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\* The war in favor of the Palatine.



“ the one hand to blindness and superstition, or on the  
 “ other hand to schism or turbulent disposition.

“ Thirdly and lastly, That they be truly sensible  
 “ not to disvalue and disparage the House with bank-  
 “ rupts and necessitous persons, that may desire long  
 “ parliaments only for protection ; lawyers of mean  
 “ account and estimation ; young men, that are not  
 “ ripe for grave consultation ; mean dependants upon  
 “ great men, that may be thought to have their voices  
 “ under command, and such-like obscure and inferior  
 “ persons ; so, that to conclude, we may have the com-  
 “ fort to see before us the very face of a sufficient and  
 “ well-composed House, such as may be worthy to be  
 “ a representation of the third estate of our kingdom,  
 “ fit to nourish a loving and comfortable meeting be-  
 “ tween us and our people, and fit to be a noble in-  
 “ strument under the blessing of Almighty God and  
 “ our princely care and power, and with the con-  
 “ junction of our prelates and peers for the settling so  
 “ great affairs as before expressed.”

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